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Executive Summary
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
inflicted enormous losses on the insurance in-
dustry and businesses. In the wake of the dis-
ruptions occurring in the insurance market at 
the time, the government enacted the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 to create a “tempo-
rary” federal backstop against catastrophic loss-
es. This program subsidized private risk with 
public funds through a cost-sharing program 
for which the government does not receive any 
compensation. 
The compelling need for the program was 
unclear even in the smoldering aftermath of 
9/11. Yet in response to effective lobbying by the 
insurance industry and business interests, Con-
gress has twice extended the program. The pro-
gram is now scheduled to sunset at the end of 
2014, 12 years after this supposedly temporary 
program was instituted. 
If there was some ambiguity about the pro-
gram’s need before, there is none now. Terrorism 
risk is not more severe than other insurable risks 
such as natural catastrophes, and a federal back-
stop stakes public money to protect the insur-
ance industry, and subsidize the terrorism risk 
insurance premiums for commercial policyhold-
ers. The private market is capable of underwrit-
ing this risk. This policy analysis suggests that 
the program should sunset as scheduled in 2014, 
thus ending this form of corporate welfare. 
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Introduction
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
2002, as amended and extended by the Ter-
rorism Risk Insurance Act of 2005 and the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reautho-
rization Act of 2007 (together referred to as 
TRIA), was initiated in the wake of the shock-
ing September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in 
New York City and Washington, D.C. TRIA 
is scheduled to sunset on December 31, 
2014. Should the program be reauthorized? 
I have previously written that the com-
mercial insurance and reinsurance markets 
are sophisticated, well resourced, and well 
capitalized, and that government intrusion 
into the workings of these markets through 
TRIA was unwarranted.1 The insurance in-
dustry absorbed the 9/11 losses and recapi-
talized lost capital, setting the stage for de-
velopment of a market for terrorism risk and 
industry growth. In 2013, 12 years after the 
dislocations of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in-
surers and businesses should fully bear the 
cost of terrorism-related losses instead of 
externalizing catastrophic loss to the pub-
lic fisc. The insurance market is capable of 
providing terrorism risk coverage without 
a federal loss backstop. Even an event like 
9/11, which was extreme and unexpected, 
did not cause systemic insolvency crisis in 
the insurance market. Since insurers and pri-
vate industry can shoulder their own losses, 
government financial support is an unwar-
ranted subsidy for insurers and commercial 
policyholders. 
The 9/11 Attacks and Aftermath
The 9/11 terrorist attacks were unprec-
edented in several ways. The terrorists strate-
gically targeted the world’s most important 
commercial and political centers. They killed 
2,976 people, displaced 1,025 businesses em-
ploying more than 75,000 people, disrupted 
another 18,000 businesses employing 563,000 
people,2 and inflicted about $23 billion in in-
sured losses.3 Along with Hurricane Andrew, 
the 9/11 attacks stood at the time as the larg-
est insurance loss arising from a single event. 
The conventional wisdom in the insur-
ance industry before 9/11 was that terrorism 
posed a discrete risk of low-intensity, high-
visibility violence, such as the 1972 Munich 
Olympics and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 
103. Losses were measured in millions of dol-
lars at worst, and lives lost in the relatively 
few. In this respect, the recent 2013 Boston 
Marathon bombing is consistent with this 
thesis of terrorism. The actuarial and pricing 
models for much of the 20th century did not 
consider terrorism as an extraordinary risk 
requiring exclusion or additional premium in 
the vein of nuclear contamination, war loss, 
or even earthquake loss. Insurers covered ter-
rorism risk in most “all risk” policies, and 
reinsurers (entities that act as insurers for in-
surance companies) did not carve out the risk 
in their treaties. The risk was perceived to be 
so small that it was covered for “free.”4 
This pricing model continued as terror-
ism slowly evolved into a major problem 
over the course of several decades. The 1990s 
introduced the era of catastrophic terrorism, 
with the phenomenon first taking root in 
Europe. The first truly catastrophic terror-
ist act occurred when the Irish Republican 
Army bombed London on April 21, 1992, 
causing $671 million in insurance losses. 
The industry recognized then that terrorism 
posed a catastrophic risk. In a prescient as-
sessment, Swiss Re stated in 1993, “A single 
bomb attack can kill thousands of people, 
cause several billion dollars of damage, and 
paralyse  entire branches of industry . . . 
[and] lay entire cities to waste.”5 Although 
9/11 was unprecedented as a manifestation 
of extreme risk, it did not beget a new aware-
ness of the risk. Scholars and policymakers 
had warned of such risks before, and indus-
try leaders were aware, at least abstractly, of 
the potentially massive exposure to terror-
ism long before 9/11.6 
Before 9/11, losses from terrorism were 
not on the scale that would threaten a whole 
economy or pose a systemic danger to the 
insurance system and business enterprises. 
But the insurance industry knew that liabil-
ity could extend into the billions of dollars. 
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If it had critically analyzed the data, the in-
evitable conclusion would have been that 
catastrophic losses would continue and that 
both frequency and severity could substan-
tially increase beyond the linear extrapola-
tions of past experience of low-intensity 
violence. With 9/11, this theoretical possibil-
ity of catastrophic risk metastasized into a 
paradigm-shifting problem for the industry, 
national economy, and government.
Importantly, while the losses from 9/11 
were extreme, the event did not truly test the 
solvency of the industry. Whereas Hurricane 
Andrew in 1992 resulted in the bankrupt-
cies of 12 small insurers,7 9/11 did not have 
the same effect on the industry. Few insur-
ers became troubled as a result of the losses. 
Reinsurers absorbed a bulk of the losses, and 
since 9/11 the insurance industry has recapi-
talized, and the financial health of the sector 
is now stronger than it was then.
Immediate Aftereffect on the Insurance 
Market 
In response to the attacks, insurers an-
nounced that they would not invoke the 
war loss exclusion—which, if successfully in-
voked, would have relieved them from paying 
damages on a loss from an act of war—with 
the caveat that they would dispute ordinary 
coverage issues. In the same breath, however, 
they indicated that terrorism risk would be 
excluded in the future.8 This was consistent 
with history. The industry reacts to a shock 
by withdrawing from the market. The last 
such shocks were Hurricane Andrew and the 
Northridge earthquake in 1994, which pre-
cipitated a withdrawal from the market by 
reinsurers. This in turn led to dramatic price 
increases in the short term.9 But as the indus-
try recapitalized, the market eventually went 
into a “soft” price cycle—in which premiums 
fell and coverage expanded—for much of the 
1990s. Then–treasury secretary Paul O’Neill 
best summarized the situation with 9/11 
this way: “Because insurance companies do 
not know the upper bound of terrorism risk 
exposure, they will protect themselves by 
charging enormous premiums, dramatically 
curtailing coverage, or—as we have already 
seen with terrorism risk exclusions—simply 
refusing to offer the coverage.”10 
After an industry shock, the first to exit 
are reinsurers. Reinsurance provides addi-
tional capital to insurers and thus increases 
insurers’ underwriting capacity. Because re-
insurers are unregulated, they can enter and 
exit markets freely. In the case of 9/11, rein-
surers bore the brunt of the losses. When a 
majority of the reinsurance treaties came up 
for renewal in January 2002, they were not 
renewed as to terrorism coverage. 
Without reinsurance, insurers could not 
limit the exposure to severe liability and felt 
compelled to exclude coverage. Their exit 
from the terrorism insurance market, how-
ever, was slowed by regulatory constraints. 
The new exclusion filed with state regulators 
broadly defined terrorism and limited cover-
age to losses of $25 million or less.11 It placed 
terrorism risk squarely on the shoulders of 
business and corporate policyholders and 
their financiers. In addition to reduced ca-
pacity, 9/11 accelerated a “price-hardening” 
cycle. Post-9/11 prices increased significant-
ly12 and some insurers cherry-picked under-
writing risks at greatly increased prices.13 
Reduced capacity and increased prices 
led to an inability to transfer risk. Unless re-
quired, for example, by financial covenants 
in debt instruments or other financial trans-
actions, few policyholders bought terrorism 
coverage. The new pricing of terrorism cov-
erage and cost-benefit perceptions of policy-
holders led to perceived adverse selection.14 
Those perceived to be most at risk (e.g., poli-
cyholders and financiers of trophy proper-
ties) were the most likely to purchase terror-
ism coverage, if such coverage was available, 
while lower-risk policyholders chose to forgo 
it. The greatest risk of terrorism was trans-
ferred, albeit selectively, to the industry, 
which could not sufficiently diversify this 
risk because of the low “take up” by lower-
risk insureds who may have been priced out 
of the market. 
The problem was that the insurance 
mechanism was unavailable when policy-
4Because TRIA 
was intended to 
be a temporary 
stabilization 
measure, it was 
enacted with a 
sunset date of 
December 31, 
2005.
holders sought to transfer some of the risk 
in the ordinary course of corporate risk man-
agement. There was either no coverage or ex-
orbitant prices. Because there was a tempo-
rary dislocation of supply and demand, the 
economy began to suffer. High premiums 
had trickle-down effects on the rest of the 
economy. Increases in financing costs led to 
a higher cost of goods and services, result-
ing in higher prices and reduced profits. The 
real estate and financing industries were hit 
the hardest. The lack of coverage and higher 
premiums increased the cost of capital and 
restricted capital flow to the real estate and 
construction sectors. Commercial mortgage-
backed securities saw a decline in overall 
credit rating and prices, and borrowers faced 
the possibility of default and loan recalls 
because of covenants requiring insurance 
coverage. Lenders were reluctant to finance 
billions of dollars of construction projects 
without terrorism coverage. 
In short, 9/11 caused substantial short-
term economic damage on a national level. 
The insurance market was perceived to be 
unstable in the short-term, causing price and 
capacity dislocation, adverse selection of risk, 
concentrated risk, economic slowdown, and 
significant job losses. In the midst of this per-
ceived temporary economic turbulence, the 
government enacted the original TRIA law. 
TRIA
On November 26, 2002, the original TRIA 
legislation was signed into law.15 In enacting 
TRIA, Congress found that the market could 
not support “reasonable and predictable 
prices” because 9/11 hindered the normal 
risk-spreading function of insurance,16 and 
this dysfunction adversely affected economic 
growth and development. The insurance and 
financial markets faced “widespread finan-
cial market uncertainties,” including signifi-
cant actuarial data and methods to properly 
allocate risk and loss.17 The withdrawal of in-
surance from the market and substantial pre-
mium increases could seriously undermine 
or otherwise suppress economic activity.18 
Congress found that the federal government 
should provide a temporary cost-sharing 
scheme while the private market figures out 
a way to deal with terrorism risk.19 Based on 
those findings, Congress enacted TRIA to as-
sure “widespread availability and affordabil-
ity of property and casualty insurance for ter-
rorism risk,” and to “allow for a transitional 
period for the private markets to stabilize, 
resume pricing of such insurance, and build 
capacity to absorb any future losses.”20
TRIA established a temporary federal re-
insurance program—a “backstop” for large 
losses from terrorism. It is a public-private 
cost-sharing arrangement. Unlike private re-
insurance, the government funds losses per 
a statutory formula, but it does not collect 
premiums or develop a reserve prior to the 
occurrence of an event. 
Because TRIA was intended to be a tem-
porary stabilization measure, it was enacted 
with a sunset date of December 31, 2005. Be-
fore that sunset, and in response to lobbying 
from insurance and business interests, the 
government extended the program through 
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act 
of 2005,21 which extended TRIA for two 
years and modified some of its key terms. 
Before sunset of the 2005 act, the program 
was again modified and extended for an-
other seven years under the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 
2007.22 TRIA now has a sunset date of De-
cember 31, 2014.23 
Current Structure of TRIA 
The U.S. secretary of the treasury admin-
isters the TRIA program, and is vested with 
the power to issue interim and final rules 
and procedures for its administration.24 
Coverage begins when the secretary certifies 
a loss caused by an “act of terrorism.” The 
secretary cannot certify an act if the aggre-
gate insurance losses comprise less than $5 
million.25 TRIA defines an act of terrorism 
as (1) “a violent act or an act that is danger-
ous to human life; property; or infrastruc-
ture; to have resulted in damage within the 
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United States, or outside the United States 
in the case of an air carrier or vessel,” and (2) 
“to have been committed by an individual 
or individuals, as part of an effort to coerce 
the civilian population of the United States 
or to influence the policy or affect the con-
duct of the United States Government by 
coercion.”26 The definition of terrorism is 
rooted in past experience of violent acts typ-
ically in the form of bombings, hijackings, 
killings, and other acts of destruction. The 
definition covers the damage or destruction 
to life or property from a physical force. 
In the original version of TRIA, a terrorist 
was defined as a person “acting on behalf of a 
foreign person or foreign interest.” The 2007 
act deleted this definitional component. The 
program now can encompass acts of domes-
tic terrorism conducted by American citizens 
or residents and does not require that the act 
be committed “on behalf” of a foreign per-
son or interest. This revised definition may 
be relevant for cases like the April 15, 2013, 
Boston Marathon bombing in which there 
appears, as of the writing of this policy anal-
ysis, to be no direct connection to a foreign 
terror sponsor. This was a broad expansion 
of the program, which initially sought to 
address the risk from radical Islamic terror-
ist organizations. TRIA now provides broad 
coverage for any violent act in furtherance of 
civilian coercion or policy influence. 
The program has two important man-
dates. First, insurers covered by TRIA “shall 
participate in the Program.”27 The program is 
mandatory as to statutorily defined insurers,28 
primarily commercial property and casualty 
insurers. Second, TRIA requires insurers to 
“make available” terrorism coverage to poli-
cyholders under terms and premium pricing 
that do “not differ materially from the terms, 
amounts, and other coverage limitations” ap-
plicable for other risks. 29 While insurers must 
make coverage available, TRIA does not man-
date that the insured must purchase terrorism 
insurance. The participation and “make avail-
able” mandates negate the terrorism exclu-
sions filed and issued in the immediate wake 
of 9/11. In return, the federal government 
bears a substantial portion of losses from ter-
rorism in a cost-sharing scheme. 
TRIA has a loss trigger. No compensation 
will be paid by the treasury secretary unless 
the aggregate industry insured loss from a cer-
tified act of terrorism exceeds $100 million.30 
This loss trigger is sufficiently large to exclude 
from the program most violent acts aimed 
primarily at human targets, such as suicide 
bombings or random car bombings. Against 
commercial targets, however, the $100 mil-
lion loss trigger is a very low threshold since 
the value of a single commercial building or 
asset can readily exceed that amount. Septem-
ber 11 was the first billion-dollar attack, but it 
was not the first catastrophic terrorist attack. 
In the recent history of terrorism, there have 
been a number of events that have exceeded 
$100 million in losses.31 The bombing of a 
single commercial airliner could easily exceed 
$100 million in losses. 
Upon trigger, there is an “insurer deduct-
ible,” which is “the value of an insurer’s di-
rect earned premiums over the calendar 
year immediately preceding [the] Program 
Year.”32 TRIA sets forth different deduct-
ible amounts for different program years. In 
years 2013 and 2014, the insurer’s deductible 
is 20 percent of the value of an insurer’s di-
rect earned premiums over the calendar year 
immediately preceeding the program year.33 
Beyond the insurer’s deductible, TRIA 
provides for a cost-sharing arrangement.34 
In years 2013 and 2014, the federal govern-
ment’s obligation to compensate is 85 per-
cent of “that portion of the amount of such 
insured losses that exceeds the applicable 
insurer deductible required to be paid” dur-
ing the specific program year.35 The insurer 
is responsible for the remaining 15 percent 
of losses exceeding the deductible. 
The federal government’s obligation to 
compensate and the insurer’s liability for 
terrorism losses are capped at the aggregate 
insured losses level of $100 billion.36 TRIA 
also caps the loss exposure of insurers, pro-
viding that “no insurer that has met [its] in-
surer deductible shall be liable for payment 
of any portion of the amount of such losses 
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that exceeds [$100 billion].”37 The treasury 
secretary determines the pro rata share of 
insured losses to be paid by each insurer 
that incurs insured losses, except that “no 
insurer may be required to make any pay-
ment for insured losses in excess of its de-
ductible under [TRIA] section 102(7) com-
bined with its share of insured losses [the 15 
percent co-pay set forth in TRIA § 103(e)(1)
(A)].”38 Thus, once the program is triggered 
by losses of more than $100 million, the in-
surer’s exposure is limited to its deductible 
plus co-pay. 
Once the federal government provides 
compensation, TRIA requires a mandatory 
recoupment amount. The mandatory re-
coupment amount is the difference between 
(1) the insurance marketplace aggregate re-
tention amount as determined by the stat-
ute,39 and (2) the aggregate amount, for all 
insurers, of insured losses that the federal 
government does not compensate because 
such losses are within the insurer deduct-
ible, or the portion of losses of the insurer’s 
co-pay amount.40 There is no mandatory re-
coupment if uncompensated losses exceed 
the aggregate retention.41 
The treasury secretary must collect re-
payment of the mandatory recoupment 
through “terrorism loss risk-spreading pre-
miums in an amount equal to 133 percent 
of any mandatory recoupment amount for 
such period.”42 The 133 percent multiplier 
is intended to neutralize the lost tax revenue 
when policyholders deduct the surcharges 
on their corporate taxes. 
If the federal government’s payment ex-
ceeds any mandatory recoupment amount, 
the treasury secretary may recoup, through 
terrorism loss risk-spreading premiums, ad-
ditional amounts based on the following 
factors:43 
 ● TRIA’s ultimate cost to taxpayers
 ● the economic conditions in the com-
mercial marketplace, including factors 
indicating the financial health of the 
insurance industry
 ● the affordability of commercial insur-
ance for small and medium-sized busi-
nesses
 ● other factors that the secretary may 
deem relevant. 
Any recoupment amount is collected as a ter-
rorism loss risk-spreading premium.44 This 
surcharge premium is imposed on property 
and casualty insurance policies in force after 
the date the surcharge is established and is 
based on the percentage of premium amount 
charged under the policy for the property and 
casualty coverage.45 
Purpose of TRIA
In determining whether TRIA should be 
reauthorized beyond the 2014 sunset, it is 
important that policymakers consider the 
legislation’s explicitly stated purpose. It was 
enacted as a temporary market stabilization 
measure, with an original sunset date of De-
cember 31, 2005:
The purpose of this title is to establish 
a temporary Federal program that 
provides for a transparent system of 
shared public and private compen-
sation for insured losses resulting 
from acts of terrorism, in order to 
(1) protect consumers by addressing 
market disruptions and ensure the 
continued widespread availability and 
affordability of property and casualty 
insurance for terrorism risk; and (2) 
allow for a transitional period for the 
private market to stabilize, resume 
pricing of such insurance, and build 
capacity to absorb any future losses, 
while preserving State insurance regu-
lation and consumer protection.46 
Based on the above statement of purpose, 
as of the writing of this policy analysis, the 
rationale for TRIA has run its course. There 
are no compelling reasons to provide yet an-
other extension of the program beyond the 
December 31, 2014, sunset, which is 12 years 
after TRIA’s enactment and 9 years after its 
original sunset date. 
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The Market for  
Terrorism Risk
Two primary arguments have been made 
to suggest that terrorism risk is unique and 
therefore should be a subject to a govern-
ment compensation program: 
 ● The risk can be extreme.
 ● The risk is unpredictable in the sense 
that it is not capable of assessment. 
These issues are related. Because the keystone 
concept in insurance is the law of large num-
bers, insurance works best when frequency is 
high and severity is relatively low, e.g., auto, 
home, and life insurance. When frequency is 
low and severity is high, as is the case in both 
man-made and natural catastrophes, assess-
ibility of risk is problematic and insurability 
is tested. Assessibility considers whether the 
risk—both frequency and severity—can be 
quantified, and this factor is perceived by 
many to be the most significant problem. 
Terrorism is similar to natural catastro-
phes in that it is random and involves low 
frequency but potentially high severity. The 
key difference is that long-term histori-
cal data exist for some kinds of repeating 
natural catastrophes and their catastrophic 
patterns are generally localized to specific 
geographic areas, for example, hurricanes 
in Florida and earthquakes in California. 
However, terrorism, while unpredictable to a 
degree, is also not random. Virtually all ter-
rorist acts in the past have been low-severity 
events. The 9/11 attack was an outlier, and 
the possibility of such events recurring in the 
future, while tangible, has become more re-
mote with the awareness 9/11 brought and 
the countermeasures that were subsequently 
implemented. Only a few spectacular acts 
will cause widespread losses. In this regard, 
terrorism is very much akin to natural catas-
trophes in frequency and severity. In the con-
text of the 20th century, 9/11 was a one-in-
100-year event. Natural catastrophes on par 
with 9/11 are equally rare and in some cases 
equally inaccessible. Yet, no one has suggest-
ed that the insurance industry should not 
cover natural catastrophes or that they are 
uninsurable.
Information is vital. Without good data 
and reliable modeling, premiums must in-
corporate a substantial markup to ensure 
proper reserving for losses. The study of ter-
rorism and collection of data have become 
top priorities of government, think tanks, 
and sophisticated members of the indus-
try. Insurers are continuing to develop risk-
factor models and methodologies to better 
assess terrorism risk. Human motivations 
and planning of attacks, intended to be un-
predictable, are difficult to model with actu-
arial rigor.47 However, patterns of terrorism 
already are evident in the data. Consider, 
for example, the commonly asserted claim 
that terrorism risk is different from natural 
catastrophes because it can strike anywhere 
as opposed to the geographic limitation of 
some natural catastrophes. While this may 
be true, it is an unpersuasive argument in 
terms of the economic consequences of ter-
rorism. Even the most cursory review of the 
unrefined data shows that most of the costli-
est catastrophes struck London, New York, 
and the airline industry. 
High-value economic targets tend to be 
concentrated in certain geographic areas, 
whether they be cities, industrial zones, cer-
tain industries, or specific assets. An attack 
in downtown Topeka, while possibly devas-
tating, will have a markedly different impact 
on the economy than an attack of the same 
scale in Manhattan, and the same applies for 
an attack on an Amtrak train as opposed to a 
commercial airline. The tragedy of 9/11 has 
many dimensions, of course, but one strik-
ing aspect is that high-value economic tar-
gets such as New York and the World Trade 
Center were considered “soft” targets prior 
to 9/11. With the realization that terrorists 
have targeted high-value economic assets, 
security around those assets has increased 
significantly. Many of those properties are 
no longer “soft” targets. Major cities, ports 
of entry, and economic assets like factories, 
dams, and skyscrapers have increased their 
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security. In response to the changes, terror-
ists have recently shifted their strategy to-
ward other soft target opportunities, a pro-
cess that confirms the dynamic uncertainty 
of containing terrorism. Post-9/11 soft tar-
get attacks have included the bombings in 
Bali, Indonesia, and the Madrid train system; 
the killing of school children in Beslan, Rus-
sia; and even the Boston Marathon bombing. 
These attacks combine random killings and 
shocking inhumanity. Albeit horrific, they 
do not pose a catastrophic economic problem. 
To the extent that soft targets are attacked, 
insurance as a risk management technique 
can adequately handle the economics of hu-
man loss and tragedy. 
There will never be a day in which ter-
rorism risk can be calculated to an actuarial 
certainty like auto or life insurance. Model-
ing terrorism risk is probably more difficult 
to do than modeling natural catastrophes 
because there has not been long-term ex-
perience or enormous scientific knowledge 
accompanying the study of terrorism. Sig-
nificant uncertainty will always surround 
terrorism risk. But it is a mistake to believe 
that uncertainty equates to inaccessibility. In 
addressing the insurability of mega-catastro-
phes like the South Asia tsunami, Swiss Re 
took the following position:
Even tsunamis or yet more extreme 
events such as meteorite impacts are 
insurable, subject to certain reserva-
tions. They cannot yet be modeled in 
such detail as other natural hazards, 
for instance earthquakes or tropical 
cyclones, but it is possible to quantify 
the risks with sufficient accuracy to 
design expedient insurance cover, and 
to spread the risk worldwide via the 
established reinsurance system.48
 If the devastation from a meteorite strike 
is insurable, what elevates terrestrial terror-
ism to that rarified level of uninsurability? 
Insurance is fundamentally a risk-taking 
industry, and there is nothing so uniquely 
compelling about terrorism risk that it be-
comes categorically uninsurable without the 
backing of the public fisc.
Terrorism risk can be extreme, but no 
more so than the risk of many different kinds 
of natural catastrophes that can strike a ma-
jor urban or commercial area where there is a 
concentration of insured interests. The argu-
ment that terrorism risk is so fundamentally 
different and thus uninsurable is self-serving 
and reflects more a lobbying strategy than 
actuarial reality. “Terrorism coverage may be 
quantitatively different, but it is not qualita-
tively different.”49
Since 9/11, there has not been another 
major terrorist attack in the geographic 
United States. During this time, the insur-
ance industry has recovered much of its loss-
es through the premiums charged to cover 
terrorism risk. No one knows when the next 
major terrorist strike will occur, perhaps this 
year or perhaps 10 years from now, but when 
it occurs there certainly will have been many 
years of premium collection and the build-
ing up of reserves. Whether that reserve is 
sufficient to pay the loss is unknown, but 
this is also a part of the business of insur-
ance—no one ever promised the insurance 
industry a guaranteed profit or solvency. The 
fundamental business of insurance is to as-
sume risk. 
Further Perspective on Catastrophic Ter-
rorism Risk 
TRIA is based on the premise that terror-
ism risk is somehow unique among classes 
of risk because the potential magnitude of 
the loss is so much greater than other cata-
strophic risks. Data suggest that this is not 
true. Terrorism risk can manifest into cata-
strophic losses in the tens of billions of dol-
lars, but the insurance industry and policy-
holders are routinely exposed to a multitude 
of mega-catastrophic risks. The following 
data on the insurance industry’s catastroph-
ic losses were compiled by Swiss Re and pub-
lished in its research journal Sigma.50 (Note: 
unless otherwise stated, all figures are re-
ported in dollar values as of the date of the 
loss and are unadjusted for time.)
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With respect to terrorism, U.S. insur-
ance losses after 9/11 have been relatively 
minimal. The aggregate losses in the years 
2003–2012 from terrorism are $433 million. 
In comparison, U.S. insurance losses for 
“social unrest” during the same time period 
were almost double the terrorism amount: 
$837 million. Losses from “accidental man-
made disasters” were more than 100 times 
the terrorism amount: $45,690 million. 
The losses from natural catastrophe were 
more than a thousand times the terrorism 
losses: $463,559 million. (Storms alone were 
$310,775 million.) Those numbers are de-
tailed in Table 1. Yet insurers have covered 
nonterrorism losses without a comprehen-
sive federal backstop. 
Another comparison that puts terror-
ism risk in perspective is a list of the top 20 
worldwide catastrophic losses incurred by 
the insurance industry from the years 1970 
to 2012. Those numbers are shown in Table 
2. Notice that 9/11 is the only man-made 
event that makes the list of the top 20 insur-
ance losses from catastrophes. 
The 9/11 attacks demonstrated that ter-
rorism losses can far exceed the billion-dollar 
threshold. However, there is little doubt that 
in the long term terrorism pales in compari-
son to natural catastrophes in frequency, se-
verity, and aggregate loss. The greatest risk of 
exogenous shock threatening the solvency of 
the industry is from a natural mega-catastro-
phe.51 With global warming and the result-
ing increase in the frequency and severity of 
storms, losses from storms pose far greater 
expected aggregate losses than terrorism. 
Note that 10 of the top 20 catastrophic loss-
es in Table 2 are weather-related losses oc-
curring after the year 2000. So what is more 
likely—an entire city destroyed by a storm 
or a terrorist attack? Yet, neither storms nor 
earthquakes are subject to broad coverage 
benefits provided by the federal government. 
The magnitude of a single event and the ag-
gregate potential losses do not distinguish 
terrorism risk from other catastrophic risks. 
This is not to diminish terrorism risk as a 
class of catastrophic risk, but neither is it to 
raise terrorism risk as the supreme specter. 
Year 
Terrorism 
($ millions)
Accidental 
Man-made 
Disasters ($ millions)
Natural 
Catastrophes
($ millions)
Storms 
($ millions)
2003  0 2,320  16,170 8,326
2004  0 2,889 45,737 38,175
2005  52.00 5,056 78,330 73,512
2006  69.00 4,043 11,838 8,265
2007  12.00 4,295 23,269 14,318
2008  300.00 7,812 44,692 39,288
2009  0 3,915 22,355 13,548
2010  0 3,606 39,869 20,126
2011  0 5,794 110,021 41,152
2012  0 5,960 71,278 54,065
Table 1
U.S. Insurance Losses by Category, 2003–2012 ($ millions)
Source: Swiss Re, Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters, annual surveys, 2003–2012.
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What, then, makes terrorism insurance 
so special or unique that it requires federal 
government intervention? My answer, as a 
point of explanation, is two-fold. First, in-
surance has traditionally covered fortuitous 
events such as storms and earthquakes. The 
suggestion that public funds should protect 
insurers and commercial policyholders from 
earthquake risk would be beyond the pale. 
The insurance industry and business interests 
cannot plausibly lobby for special protections 
against risks that insurance has routinely cov-
ered in the past. However, the manifestation 
of catastrophic terrorism risk was a public 
crisis that presented an opportunity to argue 
(lobby) effectively that this form of fortuitous 
catastrophic risk was somehow different—so 
different that it requires federal government 
intervention and protection of the insurance 
market and certain business interests. 
Second, the makeup of policyholders suf-
fering losses from storms and earthquakes, 
  Event Year Loss ($ millions)
1 Hurricane Katrina 2005 76,254
2  Japan earthquake 2011 35,735
3  Hurricane Sandy 2012 35,000
4  Hurricane Andrew 1992 26,180
5  9/11/2001 attacks 2001 24,349
6  Northridge, CA earthquake 1994 21,685
7  Hurricane Ike 2008 21,585
8  Hurricane Ivan 2004 15,672
9  Thailand floods 2011 15,315
10  New Zealand earthquake 2011 15,315
11  Hurricane Wilma 2005 14,772
12  Hurricane Rita 2005 11,869
13  U.S. Corn Belt drought 2012 11,000
14  Hurricane Charley 2004  9,784
15  Typhoon Mireille 1991  9,517
16  Hurricane Hugo 1989  8,467
17  Chile earthquake 2010  8,421
18  Storm Doria 1990  8,205
19  Storm Lothar 1999  7,994
20  U.S. storms 2011  7,453
Source: Swiss Re, Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters (years 2003 to 2012), http://www.swissre. com/
sigma/.
Table 2
Top 20 Worldwide Insurance Losses, 1970–2012
(Losses in millions of 2012 dollars)
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as opposed to terrorism, is different. Those 
exposed to natural catastrophes are diffuse 
across a broad spectrum of society, from 
individual persons to multinational busi-
nesses. The victims of the typical hurricane 
or earthquake are largely individuals. Only 
a portion of policyholders in terms of num-
bers and potential losses are business enter-
prises. On the other hand, absent a nuclear, 
chemical, or biological attack targeted at a 
major civilian center, catastrophic terrorism 
risk disproportionately affects commercial 
policyholders. Although there were heavy 
human casualties from 9/11, much of the 
insured losses were losses of tangible assets, 
such as planes and buildings, and losses 
from business interruption. TRIA is a man-
datory program for commercial property 
and casualty insurers.52 Catastrophic terror-
ism, from an insurance perspective, affects 
business interests. 
These two reasons have little to do with 
the nature or the insurability of terrorism 
risk as a fortuitous event, but instead the 
root of the program is found in the politi-
cal interest groups seeking to leverage public 
funds for their benefit. 
Perspective on the Pricing of Terrorism 
Risk 
According to a recent report by the in-
surance broker Marsh and McLennan, the 
take-up rate of terrorism risk coverage has 
increased over time. In 2003, the rate was 
27 percent, and it increased to 61 percent by 
2009. Table 3 shows the leading industries 
in terms of take-up rate in 2009.53 A vast 
majority of Marsh’s clients purchased ter-
rorism coverage, and the demand for terror-
ism coverage has been robust. 
On pricing, the cost of terrorism insur-
ance has fallen gradually over the years, with 
a more significant drop in 2009. The median 
premium rate for terrorism coverage was 
down from $37 per $1 million in coverage in 
2008 to $25 per $1 million in 2009.54 During 
2008, the median terrorism premium was 
$9,541 for a median total insured value (TIV) 
of $303 million, which is $0.0000315 of pre-
mium for every dollar of TIV. More intuitive-
ly, this price level says that $1 of premium 
in 2008 purchased coverage for $31,758 of 
property. Compare this median price level 
for terrorism premium to the median prop-
erty premium for the same period. The me-
Industry  Rate (%) 
Utilities  80
Real estate  76
Health care  76
Transportation  75
Financial institutions  74
Media  71
Hospitality  68
Education  65
Technology  61
Public entities  61
Source: Marsh and McLennan, The Marsh Report: Terrorism Risk Insurance, 2010, pp. 10–11.
Table 3
Industry Terrorism Insurance Take-up Rate (2009)
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dian property premium was $295,755 for a 
TIV of $303 million, which is $0.000967 of 
premium for every dollar of TIV, or $1 of 
premium purchased coverage for $1,024 of 
property. This is a ratio of 1:31 between ter-
rorism coverage and property coverage. 
These figures show that risks to property 
from other sources are far greater than the 
risk of terrorism as implied by insurance 
prices. The skeptic may argue that the price 
for terrorism coverage is artificially low be-
cause of TRIA, and that if there were no 
TRIA these premium levels would increase 
dramatically. There are two problems with 
this argument. The first is, why should the 
price for terrorism risk coverage be kept ar-
tificially low by government subsidization 
of risk in the first place instead of being 
allowed to be controlled by market prices? 
The response that market prices would be 
exorbitantly expensive for the private sector 
cannot be the answer. As a matter of princi-
ple, the cost of the lower price is externalized 
to the public. As a practical matter, even if 
prices dramatically increase once TRIA sun-
sets, terrorism coverage relative to property 
coverage would still be a tiny fraction of the 
overall cost of obtaining property and casu-
alty coverage for an insurable asset—mean-
ing that policyholders can readily afford 
much more expensive terrorism coverage. 
Suppose, for example, terrorism risk cover-
age quadruples. Based on the above 2008 
figures, policyholders are still looking at $1 
of premium for every $7,940 of TIV. This is a 
ratio of 1:8 between terrorism coverage and 
property coverage. 
Lastly, Marsh reported that the stand-
alone market for terrorism risk coverage, in-
cluding coverage for noncertified risks and 
international locations (risks that are not 
covered by TRIA), is significant. As of 2010, 
the insurance capacity in this market stood 
at $3.76 billion.55 The capacity supporting 
TRIA-covered risk would be much greater. 
The existence of a robust standalone mar-
ket for non-TRIA coverage for terrorism is 
direct evidence that the insurance industry 
has the capital and thus the capability of 
providing coverage outside of TRIA. If TRIA 
is removed from the equation, there would 
be much more insurance capacity that can 
be attributed to the coverage of terrorism 
risk. 
Terrorism coverage, without TRIA, would 
still be a small portion of the property and 
casualty premium and would still be afford-
able (capable of purchase) by commercial 
policyholders. The whole debate on TRIA 
and the lobbying effort by the insurance 
industry and certain business interests con-
cerns the desire to reduce the cost of cover-
age and the risk of a catastrophic loss by ex-
ternalizing this risk to the public fisc. 
Externalization of Risk  
and Cost
The 9/11 attacks showed that the old 
pricing of terrorism risk was wrong. The ex-
perience is now engraved in actuarial data-
banks, and it will be the frame of reference by 
which terrorism risk is assessed and priced. 
Without TRIA, market forces would have 
worked themselves into a new equilibrium: 
premiums would have risen with reduced 
coverage, the market would have eventu-
ally found a new equilibrium upon a more 
rational assessment of the risks, and there 
would have been more concentrated risk 
on the insurance industry and commercial 
policyholders. A dire prediction that cover-
age would disappear would not be based on 
market reality. 
The insurance industry’s financial recov-
ery from the losses of 9/11 is noteworthy. In 
the months after the attacks, insurance stock 
prices increased as investors sought to capital-
ize on anticipated hardening prices and higher 
returns on capital.56 The industry quickly re-
capitalized, and in a few short years held more 
capital than it did before 9/11.57 Between 2002 
and 2006, surplus in the property and casualty 
industry grew from $302 billion to $508 bil-
lion. 58 In the years following the attacks, in-
dustry return on equity has exceeded that of 
the U.S. industry composite.59 With replenished 
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capital and underwriting opportunity in a 
new risk, insurers would most likely have been 
forced to underwrite more coverage even with-
out TRIA, lest the new capital held by insurers 
not generate returns to shareholders. As the 
pressure to deploy the new capital builds, the 
market forces of price, supply, and demand 
take over, and a gradual decrease in premium 
pricing is inevitable as the bargaining power 
between supplier and purchaser shifts. Cur-
rently, there is an oversupply of capacity in the 
reinsurance market for terrorism risk, which 
will put downward pressure on pricing.60 
In addition to market stabilization (which 
has long been achieved), the purpose of TRIA 
was to allow time for the private market to 
devise a long-term solution to the problem 
of catastrophic terrorism risk. However, the 
government has found “little development 
or movement among insurers or reinsurers 
toward developing a private-sector mecha-
nism that could provide capacity, without 
government involvement, to absorb losses 
from terrorist events.”61 The industry’s long-
term solution appears to be lobbying for an 
extension of TRIA or “a long-term, public-
private partnership.”62 
There has always been a significant lob-
bying effort by groups arguing for such an 
extension. On the opposite side of the effort, 
an array of consumer groups, public think 
tanks, and scholars from the finance, eco-
nomic, insurance, and legal fields have ar-
gued against providing a permanent govern-
ment subsidy to an insurance industry that 
is well capitalized and financially healthy.63 
From the insurer’s perspective, there is every 
reason to continue TRIA since the provision 
of free capital is always a good thing. Lobby-
ing efforts by both the insurance industry 
and the business community resulted in ex-
tensions of the program in 2005 and again 
in 2007. There is no reason to believe that 
the same incentives will not come to bear in 
2014. Although TRIA was enacted “to allow 
for a transition period for the private mar-
kets to stabilize,” the program has gone from 
a temporary program (originally envisioned 
for three years) to a long-term, public-private 
cost-sharing arrangement (12 years). There 
is nothing to suggest that the insurance in-
dustry, now or in the future, will shun free 
reinsurance coverage for extreme risk. 
Effect of Subsidized Insurance on the 
Market 
The involvement of the government pres-
ents significant questions of fairness and 
efficiency.64 The advantages of government 
involvement are apparent. After the market 
dislocations in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11, the take-up rate of terrorism coverage 
has gone up.65 Although the amendments 
to TRIA imposed a greater share of financial 
responsibility on insurers and policyhold-
ers, the pricing continued to decline. This 
indicates that “competition has held down 
premium increases.”66 
Competition for business increases as 
the industry holds more capital. Insurance 
is a cyclical business, with price levels ebbing 
and flowing with the supply of capital. Since 
9/11, capital has flowed into the insurance 
industry. With a greater supply of capital, 
insurers will feel a need to provide terror-
ism risk coverage, whether or not there is a 
government backstop. The Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) has concluded, “In the 
absence of a federal mandate, insurers have 
a strong incentive to offer terrorism cover-
age to their commercial customers because 
to do otherwise risks their losing business 
on other property and casualty line.”67 They 
would lose business because there would be 
a competitor who would provide terrorism 
coverage to gain another insurer’s customer. 
Thus, there might be a sufficient availability 
of terrorism coverage even without TRIA.68 
Because much of the extreme risk is borne 
by the government under the program, in-
surers can underwrite terrorism with the 
knowledge that an act of terrorism will most 
likely not cause insolvency or otherwise 
threaten the existence of the firm. Indeed, 
some scholars have suggested that because 
TRIA provides cost-free coverage, the insur-
ance industry has been taking on a much 
higher degree of concentration of terrorism 
14
Government 
subsidized 
insurance has 
a net negative 
effect in terms 
of fairness and 
efficiency. 
risk as compared to other catastrophic risks. 
If manifested, that terrorism risk would be 
off-loaded to the public.69 Given the rela-
tive rarity of terrorism on American soil (no 
less catastrophic terrorism) and the more 
remote possibility given the added security 
measures in a post-9/11 world, the provi-
sion of terrorism coverage is a highly prof-
itable venture. In years 2002 to 2004 alone, 
estimates of terrorism risk premiums were 
$700 million, $2.3 billion, and $2.7 billion, 
respectively.70 These premiums do not make 
up for the losses from 9/11, but over the 
course of several more years, without fur-
ther claims, the losses would be recovered. 
At this point, a dozen years after the attacks, 
it is a safe guess that the insurance industry 
has made back, or even exceeded, its losses 
from 9/11. 
In sum, since 9/11, premiums for terror-
ism coverage have declined and the take-up 
rate of terrorism coverage has increased. 
TRIA had a significant effect. The program 
mandates that insurers “make available” 
terrorism coverage, and the existence of the 
federal backstop assures that premiums are 
no different from that of other coverages. 
This structure has substantially benefited 
the insurance industry. Terrorism risk cover-
age has provided substantial underwriting 
profit, which would also result in substantial 
investment profits. 
Problem of Subsidized Risk 
Government subsidized insurance has a 
net negative effect in terms of fairness and 
efficiency. The CBO has concluded, “TRIA 
does not lower the total costs of terror-
ism risk, but rather shifts more of the bur-
den from commercial property owners and 
their tenants to taxpayers.”71 The program 
does not have a cost-reducing effect, which 
would result in a net benefit for society, but 
it shifts some of the cost of the activities of 
well-funded, profitable industries such as in-
surance, commercial real estate, and finance 
to the public. 
The insurance industry and the business 
community can bear the full cost of terror-
ism. Although 9/11 was catastrophic, the in-
surance industry absorbed the losses.72 As of 
2007, the net worth of insurers writing com-
mercial lines covered by TRIA was about 
$187 billion, sufficient to cover a $100 bil-
lion total exposure under the program.73 A 
$100 billion hit to capital from a terrorist 
attack several multiples greater than 9/11 
would be devastating, but such an event 
would not result in a systemic failure of the 
insurance industry,74 which should be the 
benchmark for determining whether gov-
ernmental intervention is warranted or not. 
If the private sector of insurers and com-
mercial policyholders can absorb a multi-
billion dollar loss, the only justification for 
government intervention is to shift the cost 
from businesses and insurers to American 
taxpayers. This raises problems of fairness 
and efficiency. 
As to fairness, there is no reason why 
American taxpayers should partially fund 
the cost of business activity when there is no 
net social gain from such subsidization. The 
direct benefits inure to the insurance indus-
try and its policyholders, and any public gain 
is indirect in the form of a dampened shock 
to the economy with the ex ante guarantee 
of federal funds. Subsidization does not re-
duce the overall level of losses expected from 
terrorist acts; that is, terrorists would not 
be deterred because there exists some cost-
shifting mechanism; the cost of terrorism 
must be borne by the insurer, policyholder, 
or American taxpayer. Given that reality, one 
must ask why the American taxpayer should 
subsidize the cost of business activity when 
the insurers and policyholders are capable of 
assuming the costs, though the costs could 
be unpleasant under some scenarios. 
As far as efficiency, there is substantial 
evidence to suggest that TRIA’s enactment is 
not cost neutral, that is, the program affects 
the total amount of the anticipated cost of 
terrorism. If an activity does not fully inter-
nalize its cost, the externalization of some 
of the cost results in inefficient behavior. A 
tangible example can be given: Assume that 
a commercial developer has a choice of two 
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architectural designs: Design A is a state-of-
the-art glass office tower structure, which is 
highly susceptible to an attack from a truck 
bomb; Design B is a more generic structure 
made of concrete and reinforced steel. Or, 
consider a choice of location: Location A is a 
highly desirable urban location that is dense 
with high-value properties; Location B is a 
suburban location that is low-risk for a ter-
rorism strike. If the cost of procuring terror-
ism coverage is risk-based and fully incorpo-
rates the choice of design, the commercial 
developer must consider the added cost of 
insurance associated with Design A and Lo-
cation A. On the other hand, if some of the 
insurance cost is subsidized by a third party, 
then the reduction in cost adversely factors 
into the developer’s choice of architectural 
design and location. In these everyday choic-
es, businesses can opt to avoid or mitigate 
risks, though such avoidance or mitigation 
may result in costs such as loss of aesthetics, 
convenience, or financial costs. The more 
risky choice increases the cost of terrorism, 
and yet a subsidized insurance program may 
actually incentivize risky behavior, thus in-
creasing overall cost. 
These examples illustrate a fundamental 
problem of government insurance subsi-
dies.75 More importantly, it is not an abstract 
hypothetical. There is evidence that the ef-
fect described above is taking hold in the 
market. Again, the CBO has noted that “an 
abundance of evidence suggests that com-
mercial policyholders as a group are not 
taking significant steps to avoid or mitigate 
terrorism risks associated with their existing 
properties.”76 In addition to a failure to avoid 
or mitigate risk, there is evidence of undesir-
able risk taking. The CBO has also noted that 
“TRIA’s subsidies also appear to dampen the 
inclination of firms to relocate their opera-
tions away from high-risk areas,” thus reduc-
ing the risk of exposure.77 Compounding 
this problem is the fact that as a result of sub-
sidized insurance “policyholders generally do 
not receive explicit discounts on their terror-
ism insurance premiums for taking specific 
mitigation steps.”78 There is substantial rea-
son to believe, based on policy analysis and 
empirical observation, that TRIA ultimately 
increases the cost of terrorism.79 
A corporate welfare program like TRIA 
promotes subsidy-seeking behavior from 
interest groups. Consider for example this 
passage written by an insurance company:
Detractors of the federal govern-
ment’s continued involvement in ter-
rorism insurance are quick to point 
out that the insurance marketplace 
has increased surpluses to a level that 
should be able to deal with future 
terrorism losses. This argument, how-
ever, takes little account of the pres-
sures faced throughout the commer-
cial property and casualty insurance 
industry as a result of heightened 
catastrophic losses—such as a number 
of significant earthquakes in the first 
half of 2010 and a predicted above-
average Atlantic hurricane season for 
2010. Such conditions, based on a 
number of estimates, are likely to con-
tinue for the foreseeable future. In 
fact, after a relatively benign 2009, the 
first half of 2010 has seen an above 
average number of significant cata-
strophic events.80 
One could respond to the above argument 
with the quip, “So what?” The argument 
shows an inappropriate sense of entitlement 
to profit, and is irrelevant to whether a sub-
sidy should be provided or not. The business 
of insurance companies is to price the cost 
of risk transfer and, like all private enterpris-
es, to take risk. If anticipated natural cata-
strophic risk and losses are high, the industry 
must respond according to market pressures, 
which may be to withdraw from the market, 
raise prices, or pursue some other strategy 
in the competitive dynamics of an industry. 
The fact that the industry is exposed to cata-
strophic losses is simply a statement that in-
surers are in the business of assuming risk. It 
is no reason for the federal government to as-
sume the extreme portion of the risk. 
16
The public’s 
concern is not 
the preservation 
or guarantee of 
the profits of 
the insurance 
industry or its 
policyholders, 
but the systemic 
failure of the 
economic system.
Even without TRIA, terrorism coverage 
would be available in the market. Such in-
surance may and probably would be more 
expensive without a federal reinsurance pro-
gram, but the cost is a matter that would 
be allocated between the two principal 
private market actors: the insurer and the 
policyholder. As between them, the cost is 
zero-sum: the policyholder would pay more 
premiums, but eventually the insurer may 
end up having paid a greater cost. The cost 
is fully borne by the activity, and if the cost 
is deemed too high such that the activity is 
forgone, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the activity, on the whole, should not be 
initiated, which would be the result under 
a fully internalized cost structure. As seen, 
however, the program provides government 
subsidy of extreme risk. When an activity 
does not fully internalize its cost and some 
cost is externalized, there is an adverse ef-
fect. A greater total cost may result, though 
much of this is dispersed to a greater num-
ber of cost bearers (i.e., American taxpayers) 
in a way that the original risk bearers (i.e., 
insurers and policyholders) profit from the 
subsidization. This scheme would then raise 
substantial issues of fairness. 
In 2014 the government will once again 
have the opportunity to weigh these consid-
erations. One option would be to eliminate 
TRIA altogether, which is the clearly preferred 
option in light of the additional information 
and experience gained since the smolder-
ing, dark days immediately after 9/11. Even 
without TRIA, the insurance industry is ca-
pable of underwriting terrorism risk. After 
9/11 the surplus of the property and casu-
alty insurers dropped to an estimated $302 
billion.81 By 2009 the surplus reached $556 
billion. As the President’s Working Group 
on Financial Markets (a joint agency group 
comprised of officials from the Treasury, 
Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission) concluded in 2010, 
“this surplus should facilitate the provision 
of terrorism coverage.”82 Furthermore, there 
is now an over-supply of reinsurance capac-
ity for terrorism coverage, which would tend 
to reduce premiums. 
If TRIA is extended again by Congress in 
response to the insurance lobby, another op-
tion for reform of the program could be to 
incorporate an ex ante premium. The CBO 
has calculated that premiums for the rein-
surance program, if charged, would have 
had a value of approximately $850 million in 
2006 and 2007, respectively.83 It is odd that 
the government has chosen not to charge 
those premiums, which further suggests 
that TRIA is a corporate welfare program.84 
Another option, which is not exclusive of 
the collection of premium, could be to dra-
matically raise the trigger amount to the level 
of loss that would in fact cause a systemic fail-
ure of the insurance market. Presumably, this 
trigger would be far greater than the current 
trigger of $100 million—perhaps by 2014 the 
trigger amount would be on the order of $50 
billion or more. The public’s concern is not 
the preservation or guarantee of the profits 
of the insurance industry or its policyhold-
ers, but the systemic failure of the economic 
system. The effects, whether positive or nega-
tive, of a private contractual arrangement be-
tween two sophisticated parties should not 
concern the American public or the govern-
ment. If there is a loss or higher cost among 
them, they should assume that effect as part 
of doing their business. It is only when their 
activity affects third parties, who are not par-
ties to the contract and have not or cannot 
negotiate for the disposition of such effects 
(as would be the case in a systemic failure of 
the insurance industry), does the matter rise 
to one of public concern. Such failure would 
adversely affect everyone. In this regard, the 
trigger amount should reflect the level of loss 
that would endanger an entire industry as 
opposed to inflicting losses on the industry 
or endangering a few insurers or policyhold-
ers who ex post may have made bad choices. 
From this perspective, a $100 million trigger 
is really a small amount. The history of natu-
ral catastrophes, particularly in the 1990s 
and the new millennium, shows that multi-
billion dollar losses are now quite routine. 
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Conclusion
The subsidization of terrorism risk for 
the insurance industry and commercial poli-
cyholders is a form of corporate welfare. It is 
not needed. After more than a decade since 
9/11, the insurance market has had time to 
amply recover from its losses. After the fears 
of the unknown have subsided, it can more 
rationally assess terrorism risk and price it. 
There may have once been a legitimate rea-
son for a truly “temporary” stabilization 
measure, but there is no rationale for that 
measure to become a permanent federal sub-
sidy of the insurance industry. The Terror-
ism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 should sun-
set as scheduled at the end of 2014. 
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